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 The Problem of Maintaining Compliance within Stable Coalitions: Experimental Evidence 
 
Abstract: This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to 
provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to not comply with their 
commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-member 
wishes to join. To counteract the incentive to violate their commitments, coalition members fund 
a third-party enforcer. This leads to the theoretical conclusion that stable coalitions are larger 
(and provide more of a public good) when their members must finance enforcement relative to 
when compliance is ensured without the need for costly enforcement. However, our experiments 
reveal that giving coalition members the opportunity to violate their commitments while 
requiring them to finance enforcement to maintain compliance reduces the overall provision of 
the public good. The decrease in the provision of the public good is attributed to an increase in 
the participation threshold for a theoretically stable coalition to form and to significant levels of 
noncompliance. When we abandon the strict stability conditions and require all subjects to join a 
coalition for it to form, the average provision of the public good increases significantly.  
JEL Codes: H41, C92 
 
Keywords: stable coalitions, self-enforcing agreements, compliance, enforcement, public goods 
1. Introduction    
The analysis of stable coalitions is important in many contexts, including the formation of cartels 
(D’Aspremont et al. 1983; Diamantoudi 2005), voluntary environmental agreements (Carraro 
and Siniscalco 1993; Barrett 1994; Kolstad 2007; Dawson and Segerson 2008), the provision of 
threshold public goods (Van de Kragt 1983; Dawes et al. 1986; Marks and Croson 1998) and 
industry mergers (Vasconcelos 2006). Although many definitions of coalitional stability exist, 
the concept initially proposed by D’Aspremont et al. (1983) is frequently adopted. According to 
D’Aspremont et al. (1983), a coalition is considered stable if no existing member wishes to leave 
(internal stability) and no non-member wishes to join (external stability). With identical agents, 
these two conditions ensure that a stable coalition is unique, consisting of the minimum number 
of members such that each are better off than in the absence of any cooperation. In other words, a 
stable coalition is the minimum sized profitable coalition. Most economic analyses of these types 
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 of coalitions are concerned primarily with individual agents’ incentives to participate in, or 
defect from, a group of cooperating members.  As a result, the term ‘stable’ is somewhat narrow 
as it refers exclusively to defining the number of members in a coalition, not with their   
decisions to cooperate after joining.   
Without enforcement, however, individuals may first join a coalition to make certain that 
it satisfies a minimum membership requirement for formation, and then later renege on their 
commitments in an attempt to free ride off those members that continue to cooperate. For 
example, nations may become party to an international environmental agreement with the sole 
intention of satisfying a minimum membership requirement so that an agreement can enter into 
force.  Later, if compliance is not adequately enforced, nations may find it in their interest to 
violate the terms of the agreement. In general, inadequate enforcement within coalitions can 
undermine the objectives of cooperative agreements and even prevent them from forming at all.  
Despite the fact that the commitments of coalition members need to be enforced, little 
attention has been paid to this problem. In fact, most authors who examine stable coalitions 
simply assume that their members will comply fully with the terms of a cooperative agreement 
(e.g. D’Aspremont et al. 1983; Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Barrett 1994; Kolstad 2007; 
Dawson and Segerson 2008). In contrast, this study evaluates the performance of stable 
coalitions in which all members have the opportunity to violate their commitments and, 
consequently, fund a third-party enforcer to maintain compliance.  Our study consists of a 
theoretical analysis of the impact of member-financed enforcement on the size of stable 
coalitions and their provision of a public good, as well as laboratory experiments to test the main 
hypotheses of the theoretical model.  
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 Our theoretical model suggests that member-financed enforcement of compliance within 
coalitions can lead to greater participation and greater provision of a public good than when 
compliance is assured without cost. This is intuitive because more cooperation is necessary to 
offset the additional costs of enforcement to make a coalition profitable.  To test this theoretical 
result we conducted a series of experiments that utilize a threshold public good framework 
similar to those of Van de Kragt et al. (1983), Bagnoli and McKee (1991), and Marks and 
Croson (1999), but with the added compliance and enforcement dimensions.  However, our 
experimental results flatly reject the hypothesis that member-financed enforcement within stable 
coalitions leads to greater provision of a public good. Relative to the theoretical predictions, as 
well as to baseline experiments that did not allow subjects the opportunity to be noncompliant, 
requiring member-financed enforcement actually decreased the average provision of the public 
good.  
Our experimental design allows us to explain the poor performance of stable coalitions 
with member-financed enforcement in terms of the two factors that change when giving coalition 
members the opportunity to violate their commitments while requiring them to finance an 
enforcer to maintain compliance. The first is the compliance decision itself and the second is the 
theoretical outcome that the individual cost of financing enforcement leads to a higher 
participation threshold if coalitions with member-financed enforcement are to form. We 
demonstrate that both factors contributed to the poor showing of stable coalitions with member-
financed enforcement. Like other authors (Van de Kragt et al. 1983; Dawes et al. 1986; Suleimen 
and Rapoport 1992; Rapoport and Suleimen 1993; Cadsby and Maynes 1999) we find that 
increasing the participation threshold lowered the average provision of a public good because 
coalitions formed less frequently. Moreover, even though we structured the compliance 
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 incentives so that each member of a coalition had the financial motivation to comply, a 
significant number did not. 
Because theoretically stable coalitions with member-financed enforcement performed so 
poorly, we conducted another set of experiments with which we abandoned the restrictive 
internal and external stability requirements of stable coalitions and examined the performance of 
a coalition that was costly to enforce, but required full participation to form. This requirement 
did not change average compliance rates within coalitions, but it significantly increased both the 
frequency of coalition formation and the overall provision of the public good. Our results suggest 
important lessons for the determination of threshold rules for coalition formation and for 
enforcing compliance within coalitions. Improving coalition formation and compliance within 
coalitions requires a higher participation threshold, perhaps full participation, and more stringent 
enforcement than suggested by theory. 
 
2. Stable coalitions to provide a public good 
In this section we present simple models of the formation of coalitions to provide a public good 
that form the basis for our experiments. In particular we derive equilibrium levels of 
participation in these coalitions when they require member-financed enforcement and when they 
do not. Comparing these participation levels provides the main hypothesis of this paper: member 
financed enforcement of compliance within stable coalitions leads to greater participation than 
when compliance is assured without cost. Since our theoretical development and experiments 
have individuals deciding whether to provide a single unit of a public good, increased 
participation in coalitions also implies increased provision of the good.  
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 2.1 Stable coalitions without the need for costly enforcement  
Consider n homogeneous players with payoff functions   
() ii i Ab q q c q i π − =+ + − ,          [ 1 ]    
where  is equal to one if player i contributes to the public good and is zero if she does not,  i q i q−  
is the sum of the contributions by all other players, b is the constant marginal benefit of public 
good contributions, c is the cost of contributing to the public good, and A is a positive constant.  
The structure of the players’ interactions is an n-player prisoners’ dilemma, requiring bc <  and 
.  That is, all players have a dominant strategy to not contribute to the public good in a 
noncooperative Nash equilibrium, but their joint payoffs will be maximized when they all 
contribute. Thus, the players have an incentive to form a cooperative agreement to provide the 
good.  
nb > c
Suppose at first that compliance with such an agreement is assured without cost.  
Following Ulph (2004) and Kolstad (2007), we model coalition formation as a two-stage game. 
In the first stage, each player decides independently whether to join a coalition to provide the 
public good. In the second stage, all players decide whether to contribute their unit of the good. 
The players that do not join the coalition in the first stage maximize their individual payoffs by 
not contributing to the public good in the second. Those that do join in the first stage commit to 
decisions in the second stage that maximize the joint payoffs of the coalition members, given that 
the non-members will not contribute.  
  The members of a coalition commit to contributing to the public good in the second stage 
as long as each of them is at least as well off with all members contributing as they would be if 
no player contributed to the public good. That is, a coalition must be profitable for its members. 
Let s denote the number of players who join a coalition in the first stage; let  denote the  ( )
m s π
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 payoff of each of the coalition members if they decide to contribute to the public good, and let 
 denote the payoff of each of the non-members.  (The superscript m signals that the player 
in question is a member of the coalition, while the superscript nm signals that the player is not a 
member of the coalition).  From [1], the payoff functions for each coalition member and for each 









nm sA b π =+.         [ 2 ]  
Since  ,  , and   is increasing in s, there exist coalition sizes that are strictly 
greater than one and weakly less than n that are profitable. The smallest of these profitable 
coalitions is  
bc < nb c > ( )
m s π
           [3]  min | ( ) (0) min | / .
nc m nm ss s s s c ππ =≥ =
Throughout, the superscript nc denotes values when the decisions of the coalition members do 
not require costly enforcement. If  in the first stage of the game, the members of the 
coalition agree that each of them will contribute to the public good in the second stage. If 
nc ss ≥
nc ss < , 
the coalition members do not contribute to the public good in the second stage.   
Following D’Aspremont et al. (1983) a coalition is stable if no member of the coalition 
wants to leave the agreement (the coalition is internally stable) and no non-member wants to join 
the agreement (the agreement is externally stable). It is easy to demonstrate that in this game the 
only internally and externally stable coalition size is the smallest profitable coalition,   To see 
why, note for a coalition size   that any member could leave the coalition and the 
remaining members would still find it profitable to contribute to the public good. Using the 




( 1) ( 1)
nm sA b s π − =+ −, which is 
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 greater than its payoff if it stayed in the coalition,  ( )





, by the amount   
Since individuals are motivated to leave a coalition of any size  , these coalitions are not 
internally stable. On the other hand, a coalition of size s = is internally stable, because if one 
member leaves the coalition it is no longer profitable for the remaining members to contribute to 
the public good. Since no individual would provide the public good in this case, a defector’s 
payoff would simply be  , which is weakly less than its payoff if it stayed in the 
coalition, . Finally, a coalition with  members is externally stable 
because no non-member would want to join. To see why calculate   
 which indicates that an individual who joins the smallest profitable coalition is worse 





nm A π =
n c b s c −
nc s
( )





mn c n ππ +−
bc =−
Since coalitions of size   are the only internally and externally stable coalitions, the 
subgame perfect equilibrium of the coalition formation game is that   players join the coalition 
in the first stage and make their contributions to the public good in the second. The remaining 
players contribute nothing in the second stage of the game.  
 
2.2 Stable coalitions with member-financed enforcement  
We now give coalition members the opportunity to violate their commitment to provide the 
public good. To counteract this, coalition members fund an independent enforcer who monitors 
the behavior of coalition members and applies a sanction when one is found not contributing to 
the public good. Following McEvoy and Stranlund (2008), this game is played in four stages.  In 
the first stage, players decide independently whether to join a cooperative coalition. In the 
second stage, members of the coalition jointly agree on whether to contribute to the public good. 
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 If they do agree to contribute to the public good, each member is required to contribute funds to 
the independent enforcer. If the coalition members decide not to contribute to the public good in 
stage 2, they do not fund the enforcer and the game ends with no contributions to the public 
good. If the coalition members agree to contribute to the public good in stage 2, they move onto 
stage 3 in which all players make their contribution decisions independently. Finally, in stage 4, 
the enforcer randomly audits the coalition members and applies a sanction when a member is 
found not contributing to the public good. Because the game is solved by backward induction we 
begin by describing the last stage. 
 
2.2.1 Enforcement stage   
If the game reaches this stage, a coalition of s members has formed, each member has agreed to 
contribute to the public good, each member has provided x dollars to fund the enforcer, and all 
players have made their contributions.  In this stage, the enforcer randomly audits the decisions 
of the coalition members with a probability that is an increasing function of the amount of 
funding the members provide.  Each additional dollar of funding allows the number of random 
audits to increase by 0 α > . Thus, if s coalition members each provide x to fund the enforcer, 
then the number of random audits conducted issxα  and the probability that any member is 
audited is  
   / p sx s x α α == .         [ 4 ]  
A member that is revealed to be noncompliant by the enforcer incurs a known exogenous 




 2.2.2 Contributions stage 
At this point in the game the coalition members have agreed to contribute to the public good and 
have funded the enforcer. In this stage both coalition members and non-members independently 
choose whether to contribute to the public good. All non-members will chose to not contribute, 
but coalition members make this decision by comparing the expected cost of not complying with 
their agreement and the benefit of noncompliance.  
Assume that the coalition members are risk neutral and that they comply if they are at 
least indifferent between compliance and noncompliance.  Then, given a coalition of s members, 
in the contributions stage an individual member will comply if its expected payoff from doing so 
is not less than its expected payoff from noncompliance.  Given the probability of an audit p and 
the sanction f,  a compliant coalition member’s payoff is ( )
m sx π − , while a noncompliant 
member’s expected payoff is  , where   and  ( 1)
nm sx π −−− p f ( )
m s π ( 1)
nm s π −  are defined by  
[2]. Since the individuals are identical and coalition members face the same enforcement 
parameters, all members either comply or all do not. Therefore, each coalition member complies 
with the terms of the agreement if and only if  
[( )] [ (1 ) ]
mn m sx s x p f ππ −− −− − = () pf c b 0 − −≥ ;            [ 5 ]  
that is, each coalition member complies as long as the expected penalty pf is not less than the 
gain from noncompliance c . Clearly, this is a necessary condition if a coalition of individuals 
who contribute to the public good is to form.  Therefore, we will assume
b −






 2.2.3 Agreement stage 
In this stage the coalition members agree to contribute to the public good and to fund the 
enforcer provided that these decisions maximize their joint payoffs. Each member’s contribution 
to the enforcer, x, is endogenous so we determine this value first.  If a coalition of contributors is 
to form, each member would like to contribute as little as possible while providing the enforcer 
with sufficient resources to maintain compliance within the coalition.  This requires a payment x 
so that pfc b ≥−binds. Since  px α =  from [4], the contribution to the enforcer that is required of 
each coalition member is  
() / . x cb f α =−         [ 6 ]    
  Coalition members will fund the enforcer and jointly agree to contribute to the public 
good only if they will be at least as well off as without the coalition.  Again, contributing to the 
public good must be profitable for the members of the coalition.  Given a coalition of s members 
that each earn   ( )
m sx π − A bs c x =+− −  if they contribute to the public good, and a player’s 
payoff in the absence of a coalition, A, the minimum size profitable coalition is the smallest s 
such that A bs c x +− −
) / bbf
A ≥. Substituting for x from [6] and rearranging terms yields 
/( b c sc α ≥+ − . Thus, the minimum sized profitable coalition when members bear the 
cost of enforcing compliance within the coalition is 
min | / ( )/
c ss s c b c b b f α =≥ + −,       [ 7 ]    
where the superscript c indicates that enforcing compliance is costly for the members. If   
players join a coalition in the first stage of the game (the membership stage), they will agree to 
contribute to the public good in the second stage (the agreement stage).  Furthermore, each 
member pays x from [6] to the enforcer in this stage and will comply with the terms of the 
c ss ≥
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 agreement in stage three (the contributions stage).  On the other hand, if
c ss <  from the first 
stage, the coalition members maximize their joint payoff eciding not to contribute to 
public good and they do not fund the enforcer.  Thus, if 
c ss
s by d the 
<  in the membership stage a 
oalition of contributors to the public good does not form and the game
co , 
s 
. Profitable  ns 
uired
c  concludes.    
 
2.2.4 Membership stage 
As in the coalition formation game without the need for costly enforcement, the equilibrium 
alition size when member-financed enforcement is required is the smallest profitable coalition
c s  defined by [7]. In contrast to the game in which compliance is assured, profitable coalition
may not exist when enforcement is required exist when enforcement is 
 if and only if 
c ns ≥ , or using [7],  /( nc b c
coalitio
) / bb req f α ≥+ ve assumed tha
/ nc b > , there is nothing in th odel that guarantees  / ( )/ nc b cbbf
− . Wh t 
e m
ile we’
α ≥+ . Thus, a large 
benefit from noncompliance cb − , a low monitoring productivity 
−
α , or a low sanction f, can 
prevent a coalition from forming. However, if 
c ns ≥ , then 
c s  players will join a coalition in the 
first stage of the game. They will agree to contribute to the public good and fund the enforcer in
the second. In the third stage they all contribute to the public good, while the non-members do 
not. In the fourth stage the enforcer randomly audits the decisions of the coalition members b
finds no violations. This is the subgame perfect equilibrium of the coalition formation game 
when cooperation requires 
 
ut 
member-financed enforcement and enforcem t costs do not prevent 






 2.3 Enforcement costs and size of stable coalitions 
When a coalition that requires member-financed enforcement forms, it is likely to have mo
members and provide more of the public good than when compliance within a coalition is 
enforced without cost. To see why, recall from [3] that the equilibrium coalition size when co
enforcement is not required, 
nc s , is the least s for which  /. sc b ≥   When a coalition requires 
costly enforcement and this req irement this does not prev rming, fro
ize, 
c s , is the least s for which  / ( )/ . sc b cbbf
re 
stly 
t a coalition from fo m [7] 
the equilibrium coalition s
u en
α ≥+ −  Since 
() / 0 cbbf α −> , 
cn c ss ≥ .  The reason for this result is that funding the enforcer is an additiona
cost of joining a coalition to provide a public good; hence, a greater amount of the public good 
needs to be provided to make the coalition profitable. When each individual has one unit of the
public good to contribute, this requires greater participation in the co
l 
 
alition. The experiments 
escribed in the next section were designed to test this hypothesis.  
 
ime. 
tor.  After answering a series of practice 
ther 
                                                
d
 
3. Experimental design  
All of the experimental sessions were held in a computer lab at our university <to be included>
using undergraduate and graduate students recruited from the general student population. The 
subjects were brought into the computer lab, seated and paid five dollars for arriving on t
The instructions were read aloud by the modera
questions the subjects began the experiment.
1   
  For each treatment, the subjects were placed in groups of n = 10, and during each session 
two 10-subject groups were in the lab concurrently. At the start of each period, subjects were 
randomly reassigned to one of the two groups such that the same ten people were never toge
 
1 The complete experiment instructions are available at the lead author’s website <to be included>. <We have 
included the instructions with this submission as a reviewers’ appendix>  
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 in the same group more than once.  The random assignment of groups was done to mitigate 
potential problems of reputation that can occur when the same subjects interact in a repeated 
setting (Andreoni and Croson 2002).  Two 13-round sessions were conducted for each treatment, 
resulting in 52 group level observations and 520 individual level observations per treatment.  
Earnings were reported in experimental dollars, with ten experimental dollars exchanged for on










                                                
earned 23 dollars, ranging from 15 to 33 dollars (standard deviation = 4.33 dollars). 
  To avoid potential biases subjects may have regarding the provision of public goods, an
to generalize our results to other applications of stable coalitions, we chose a neutral frame for
the context and language of the experiments. Specifically, rather than having subjects decide 
whether to join a coalition with the others to provide a public good, they chose either to agree to 
produce one unit of an unspecified product, or not agree to produce the unit.  An agreement wa
said to ‘for
w t.  
  One of the unique features of our design is that while subjects were making their 
decisions, they were provided with real-time information about the decisions of the other nine 
subjects in the group.
2  Specifically, they were informed about the number of other subjects th
already agreed to produce, the number of other subjects that did not agree to produce and the 
number of other subjects that had not yet made a decision.  The real-time information feature 
was included for two reasons.  First, it best represents the timing and information of participation 
decisions in real cooperative coalitions (e.g., international treaties) in which agents decide whe
relative to others, to join or not join.  Second, the information was provided to avoid potential 
 
2 A similar real-time mechanism was introduced in the context of a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) by 
Dorsey (1992) and by Kurzban et al. (2001). To our knowledge, we are the first to include the real-time feature into 
threshold public good experiments.   
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 coordination problems that typically arise when decisions are made simultaneously.   To cap 
length of each period, subjects had 60 seconds to make their decisions.  If a subject failed to 
decide before the time was up, she chose not agree to produce by d
the 
efault. Subjects were not 
llowed to communicate with each other in any of the treatments. 
h 
ir 








3.1 Costless enforcement-low    
Our first treatment provides the incentives players face in the model from section 2.1 in whic
compliance within a cooperative coalition is costless to enforce (and therefore there was no 
compliance choice—those who agreed to produce automatically followed through with the
agreement). For reasons that will become obvious shortly, we chose the individual cost of 
producing the good to be low (i.e., low c) and called this treatment costless enforcement-low.  It 
provides a baseline to judge the effects
to the coalition formation game.          
  In each period, the only decision a subject had to make was whether to agree to produce
or not agree to produce the unit. We chose parameter values of n = 10 A = 8, b = 3 and c = 7 
for equation [1], and derived the theoretically stable coalition size of 
nc s = 3 using equation [3].  
Thus, the participation threshold for costless enforcement-low was set at 3 members.  If a
three of the ten group members agreed to produce, then the agreement formed and 
individuals that agreed to produce automatically produced the product and earned  ( )
m s π  using
[2].  If less than three group members agreed to produce, the entire group did not produce and 
each subject earned eight experimental dollars,  (0) 8.
nm π =   Those subjects that chose not agr
uce, did not produce
ee 
to prod  the product regard  whether a coalition form
 according to [2].   




   Table 1 shows the matrix of payoff possibilities the subjects were given for each period 
of the experiment, the form of which is similar to that used by Rapoport and Eshed-Levy (1989).  
The boxes marked with an X indicate outcomes that are not possible because the participation 
threshold would not be met in these circumstances.  To see why, note that the top row of the 
earnings table corresponds to the number of other subjects (ranging from 0 to 9) producing the 
good.  However, production can only occur if at least three members of the group agree to 
produce.  Therefore, under no circumstances could only one or two members of the group 
produce the good, hence the X’s.  All elements of the earnings table were clearly explained to the 
subjects before the experiment began.     
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
3.2 Costly enforcement 
Our second treatment was designed to incorporate the elements of the model of member-
financed enforcement of compliance within a stable coalition that we presented in section 2.2.  
We called this treatment costly enforcement.  Relative to the costless enforcement-low treatment, 
we added two stages to the costly enforcement treatment. Provided that enough subjects agreed 
to produce to meet the participation threshold, those who agreed to produce then had to decide 
whether to abide by this decision and actually produce. These compliance decisions were made 
simultaneously and without real-time feedback. After the coalition members made these 
decisions their choices were randomly audited and detected cases of noncompliance were 
sanctioned. All audits and sanctions were kept private.  
  The values of n, A, b and c were set exactly as in the costless enforcement-low treatment. 
In addition, we chose an audit probability of  0.8 p =  and a penalty for noncompliance of  6 f =  
16 
 as the enforcement parameters applied to the members of a coalition. Note that the expected 
penalty for noncompliance was pf = 4.8. The subjects were told the audit probability and 
sanction at the beginning of each period, but they were not told the expected penalty. Because 
the benefit from noncompliance was c – b = 4.0, the expected penalty was more than sufficient to 
induce compliance by risk-neutral agents. (Refer to the condition for compliance provided by 
equation [5]).  The cost of enforcing compliance with the agreement for each member of a 
coalition was set at  . (Using equation [6], this implies a marginal productivity of 
resources devoted to monitoring of 
8.08 x =
0.619 α = ).   We did not have members of a coalition 
actually pay x; rather it was implicit in the calculation of their earnings.  
  Using [7], the stable coalition size in this treatment is six members, so the subjects were 
told that the participation threshold for an agreement to form was six subjects. If less than six 
subjects agreed to produce, the entire group did not produce and each subject earned eight 
experimental dollars,   If six or more subjects agreed to produce, individual earnings 
for each possible scenario in the costly enforcement treatment are provided in Table 2.
(0)
nm π
        
8. =
3 The 
subjects were given this table at the start of each period of this treatment.  The second row in the 
table shows the potential earnings for a coalition member that complies with the agreement by 
choosing to produce. The third and fourth rows show earnings for a noncompliant coalition 
member, one who agreed to produce then chose not to. The third row gives the earnings of the 
subject when it is audited while the earnings in the fourth row assume the subject was not 
audited. The difference in earnings between these two rows is simply the f = 6 penalty for 
noncompliance. The final row lists the potential earnings for a subject that does not join the 
coalition and, therefore, does not produce.  
                                          
3 The values in Table 2 are calculated earnings rounded to the nearest whole number, except for negative earnings 
which are set at zero to make sure that subjects did not lose money in the experiments.  
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 [Insert Table 2 here] 
 
3.3 Costless enforcement-high 
The third treatment is the same as the costless enforcement-low treatment except that the cost of 
production was increased to c =15.08.  This higher production cost is denoted as H c , and we refer 
to this treatment as costless enforcement-high. This higher cost parameter was chosen so that the 
increase in production cost between the costless enforcement-low treatment and the costless 
enforcement-high treatment is equivalent to the individual cost of enforcing compliance in the 
costly enforcement treatment; that is,  8.08. H xc c = −=  Because of the higher production cost, 
the stable coalition size for the costless enforcement-high treatment is 6 members, the same 
stable coalition size and participation threshold as for the costly enforcement treatment. Table 3 
is the payoff table we provided each subject in this treatment. Note that it takes a similar form to 
the earnings table for the costless enforcement-low treatment, except that more outcomes are not 
possible (those marked by an X) because of the higher participation threshold.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Structuring the costless enforcement-high treatment so that the participation costs and the 
participation threshold are equivalent to that of the costly enforcement treatment allows us to 
isolate two effects of the compliance problem in stable coalitions. The first effect is the 
compliance decision itself while the second is the higher participation threshold that is associated 
with the additional costs of enforcing compliance within stable coalitions. Since the predicted 
participation levels are the same in the costless enforcement-high and the costly enforcement 
treatments, we can isolate the impact of the compliance decision on the performance of 
cooperative coalitions by comparing the results from these two treatments. Moreover, by 
18 
 comparing the results of the costless enforcement-high treatment with the costless enforcement-
low treatment we can separate the effect of the higher participation cost and higher participation 
threshold from the compliance decision effect. 
 
3.4 Costly enforcement-full 
In this final treatment, we abandoned the internal and external stability conditions for 
determining the participation threshold and tested the performance of a coalition that requires 
member-financed enforcement, but also requires full participation.  We call this treatment costly 
enforcement-full. For this treatment we maintained the same parameter choices as in the costly 
enforcement treatment, but we raised the participation threshold from six to ten subjects. As with 
the costly enforcement treatment, if the ten-subject threshold was satisfied, each member then 
had to decide whether to comply by producing the good. After these decisions, the coalition 
members were monitored and detected cases of noncompliance were sanctioned. The earnings 
table we provided the subjects in this treatment is the same as the one provided for the costly 
enforcement treatment (Table 2). A summary of our experimental design is provided in Table 4.   
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
4.  Results 
Much of our analysis of the experimental data is based on Tables 5 and 6. For each treatment 
Table 5 contains the average provision of the public good, the percentage of times a coalition 
formed, the average number of members of coalitions, as well as the average compliance rates by 
members of coalitions under the costly enforcement and costly enforcement-full treatments. Table 
6 contains average individual earnings when coalitions formed for members and non-members 
19 
 under the costless enforcement-low and costless enforcement-high treatments, as well as for 
compliant members of coalitions under the costly enforcement and costly enforcement-full 
treatments. We report the average expected earnings of noncompliant coalition members (gross 
earnings minus the 4.8 expected penalty) under these treatments.
4 Our model predictions for 
each treatment are that coalitions form 100% of the time, the number of coalition members and
the provision of the good exactly equal the participation threshold, and that coalition members 
are always compliant under the costly enforcement and costly enforcement-full treatment
 
s.  
                                                
[Insert Table 5 here] 
   Recall the main hypothesis of our theoretical model of section 2: relative to stable 
coalitions that do not require enforcement, the possibility of noncompliance within stable 
coalitions and member-financed enforcement to maintain compliance results in greater 
participation in coalitions and, consequently, higher provision of a public good. This hypothesis 
is clearly rejected by our experimental data. Although the average number of members of 
coalitions that formed was significantly higher under the costly enforcement treatment than under 
the costless enforcement-low treatment as predicted (6.68 vs. 4.26, p < 0.001), the average 
provision of the public good was significantly less under the costly enforcement treatment (2.46 
vs. 4.10, p = 0.002).
5 This occurred because coalitions formed much less frequently under the 
costly enforcement treatment (53.8% vs. 96.2%, p < 0.001), and because of the significant 
amount of noncompliance under this treatment.
6  
 
4  We use expected, rather than actual, earnings because this is what subjects would likely be using as a basis for 
making decisions.   
5 Unless otherwise noted, all paired-comparison statistical tests are Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests and all single 
sample tests of predicted Nash values are Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. 
6 Dawes et al. (1986) found that the participation threshold was reached in 100% of trials with a low participation 
threshold of 3 of the 7 players. This is consistent with the 96.2% participation rate in our costless enforcement-low 
treatment, where the participation threshold is 3 of 10 players. 
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 The data in Table 5 indicate that the subjects under the costly enforcement treatment did 
not come close to meeting theoretical expectations. Although when coalitions formed they had 
more members than the six predicted (6.68, p < .001), there was a substantial amount of 
noncompliance in these coalitions (31.6%). Moreover, coalitions formed only 53.8% of the time. 
The high rates of noncompliance and the low frequency of coalition formation produced an 
average provision of the public good in this treatment of only 2.46 units, which is far below the 6 
units predicted.   
  The low provision of the public good under the costly enforcement experiments is also 
reflected in the subjects’ earnings (Table 6). On average, those who joined a coalition (agreed to 
produce) under the costless enforcement-low treatment were better off than those who joined a 
coalition under the costly enforcement treatment regardless of whether the coalition members 
actually complied with the agreement (14.73 vs. 7.67, p < 0.001 for compliant coalition members 
and 14.73 vs. 7.86, p < 0.001 for noncompliant members). Compliant coalition members and 
noncompliant coalition members earned about the same under the costly enforcement treatment 
(7.67 vs. 7.86, p =.499), and there is no statistical difference (at the 0.05 level) between these 
earnings for coalition members and the 8 experimental dollars each would have earned had no 
coalition formed in the first place (p = .085 for compliant members and p = .432 for 
noncompliant members).  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
  Recall that we conducted the costless enforcement-high experiment to separate the effect 
of a higher participation cost and higher participation threshold for coalitions that require 
member-financed enforcement from the effect of giving coalition members the opportunity to 
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 violate cooperative agreements. Thus, we can explain the poor performance of the costly 
enforcement treatment by examining the relative importance of these effects. 
  Note first that when coalitions formed under the costless enforcement-high treatment they 
contained more than the predicted number of members on average (6.19), but coalitions formed 
less frequently under this treatment than predicted and in comparison with the costless 
enforcement-low treatment (61.5% vs. 96.2%, p < 0.001). These results are consistent with 
several other threshold public goods studies that found that raising the participation threshold 
reduced the percentage of trials in which a public good is provided (Van de Kragt et al. 1983; 
Dawes et al. 1986; Suleimen and Rapoport 1992; Rapoport and Suleimen 1993; Cadsby and 
Maynes 1999). Because coalitions formed less frequently under the costless enforcement-high 
treatment, the average provision of the public good was significantly less than the predicted 6 
units (3.81 units, p < 0.001) and statistically indistinguishable from the average provision of the 
good under the costless enforcement-low treatment (3.81 vs. 4.10, p = 0.243). Thus the higher 
participation cost and participation threshold had no effect on the average provision of the public 
good.  
  Now let us compare the outcomes of the costless enforcement-high treatment to the costly 
enforcement treatment. Coalitions formed under the costless enforcement-high treatment about as 
frequently as under the costly enforcement treatment (61.5% vs. 53.8%, p = 0.742).
7 Although 
coalitions tended to have more members under the costly enforcement treatment than under the 
costless enforcement-high treatment (6.68 vs. 6.19, p = 0.009), noncompliance under the costly 
                                                 
7 These participation rates fall well within the typical 50 – 70% range found in most threshold public goods 
experiments (Van de Kragt et al. 1983; Dawes et al. 1986; Isaac et al. 1989; Rapoport and Eshed-Levy 1989; Erev 
and Rapoport 1990; Suleimen and Rapoport 1992; Rapoport and Suleimen 1993; Mysker et al. 1996; Marks and 
Croson 1998; Marks and Croson 1999). A handful of other studies have found results that do not fall into the 50 – 
70% participation range, including Cadsby and Maynes (1999) who found that the public good is provided in only 
26% of pooled trials and Bagnoli and Mckee (1991) who found that the public good was provided in 83% of all 
trials.      
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 enforcement treatment more than offset this higher membership so that the average provision of 
the public good was significantly higher under the costless enforcement-high treatment (3.81 vs. 
2.46, p = 0.002). Thus, holding the participation costs and threshold constant, giving coalition 
members the opportunity to be noncompliant, but randomly auditing and fining them to maintain 
compliance, had a significant negative effect on the cooperative provision of the public good. 
Moreover, the earnings data in Table 6 indicate that the noncompliance under the costly 
enforcement treatment led to lower earnings. The average earnings of coalition members under 
the costless enforcement-high treatment were significantly higher than the earnings of the 
compliant coalition members under the costly enforcement treatment (11.70 vs. 7.67, p < 0.001) 
as well as the average expected earnings for noncompliant coalition members (11.70 vs. 7.86, p 
< 0.001).  
  We are now ready to specify the relative impacts of the higher participation cost and 
threshold effect and the compliance decision effect on the significant underprovision of the 
public good under the costly enforcement treatment. Average provision of the public good under 
this treatment is 3.54 units below the prediction of 6 units. The higher participation cost and 
threshold component of these 3.54 units is the difference between the predicted 6 units and 
average provision under the costless enforcement-high treatment, that is, 2.19 units (about 62% 
of the total effect).  The compliance decision component is the remaining 1.35 units (about 38%). 
Thus, the poor performance of the costly enforcement treatment relative to its theoretical 
prediction is explained by both the higher participation cost and threshold effect and the 
compliance decision effect. Moreover, the higher cost and threshold effect (2.19) is significantly 
greater than the compliance decision effect (1.35, p = 0.015), suggesting that the cost and 
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 threshold effect accounts for most of the underprovision of the public good under the costly 
enforcement treatment relative to the predicted provision of the good. 
  However, relative to the provision of the public good under the costless enforcement-low 
treatment, nearly all of the underprovision of the good under the costly enforcement treatment is 
due to the compliance effect. Average provision of the public good under the costly enforcement 
treatment is 1.64 units below average provision under the costless enforcement-low treatment. 
The higher participation cost and threshold component of this is the difference between the 
average provision of the good under the costless enforcement-low treatment and average 
provision under the costless enforcement-high treatment, that is, only 0.29 units. We have 
already noted that this difference is not statistically different from zero (p = 0.243).  However, 
the compliance decision effect is the remaining 1.35 units, which is highly significant (p = 
0.002).  
  The subjects under the costly enforcement-full treatment fared much better than under the 
costly enforcement treatment. Recall that the costly enforcement-full treatment is exactly the 
same as the costly enforcement treatment, except that instead of setting the participation 
threshold at the theoretically stable coalition size, we required full participation for a coalition to 
form. Although the average compliance rate within coalitions under the costly enforcement-full 
treatment was not significantly different from the compliance rate under the costly enforcement 
treatment (71.3% vs. 68.4%, p = 0.471), coalitions formed more frequently (88.5% of the time 
vs. 53.8%, p < .001).
8  Consequently, the average provision of the public good was significantly 
higher under the costly enforcement-full treatment than under the costly enforcement treatment 
                                                 
8 We also compared compliance decisions at the individual level between costly enforcement with costly 
enforcement-full by estimating a population-average, logistic regression model. The population-average model tests 
whether there is a significant difference in an ‘average’ subject’s decision to comply between the two treatments 
with costly enforcement.  We find that the average subject in both treatments is equally likely to comply, p = .768.    
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 (6.31 vs. 2.46, p < 0.001). Not surprisingly, average payoffs for those who complied under the 
costly enforcement-full treatment were higher (15.46 vs. 7.67, p < 0.001), as were average 
expected payoffs for those who did not comply (13.93 vs. 7.86, p < 0.001). 
To complete this section, we demonstrate that the results of the experiments are 
reasonably stable over the 13 rounds of each treatment. Figure 1 shows the time series of average 
coalition membership and average public good provision over the 13 periods in each treatment. 
The dark horizontal lines indicate the participation threshold for each treatment. Note that 
coalition membership is stable over periods for each treatment. To formally test whether 
coalition membership changed significantly from the beginning of each experiment to the end, 
we compare coalition membership between the first four periods and the last four periods for 
each treatment. We fail to reject the hypotheses that average coalition memberships is the same 
across the two time segments of the data (costless enforcement-low, p = .5284; costless 
enforcement-high, p = .1893; costly enforcement, p = .1567; costly enforcement-full, p = .2787). 
We do, however, note a drop in the average provision of the public good when comparing the 
first and last four periods under the costly enforcement treatment (p = .0575), and to a lesser 
extent, under the costless enforcement-high treatment (p = .0819). 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
We have examined the compliance and enforcement problem in cooperative coalitions to provide 
a public good. The notion of coalitional stability that we use—that of internal and external 
stability—has been used in many theoretical contexts including cartels, international 
environmental relations and voluntary pollution control agreements between sources of pollution 
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 and regulators. In most of these applications, however, the rather obvious point that even 
cooperative arrangements must be enforced has been ignored. We have presented a theoretical 
model in which members of a coalition to provide a public good finance enforcement of 
commitments by coalition members. Our main result of this theoretical exercise is that when 
stable coalitions that require member-financed enforcement form they will have greater 
participation levels. Consequently, provision of the public good should be higher. The intuition is 
simple: participation in stable coalitions is higher because the added cost of enforcement must be 
offset by an increase in public good provision to make a cooperative coalition worthwhile.  
  Our laboratory test of this hypothesis is definitive—the hypothesis is flatly rejected. In 
experiments with member-financed enforcement when the participation threshold was set at the 
theoretically stable coalition size, public good provision was well below the theoretical 
prediction. Moreover, public good provision was below the levels obtained in a treatment that 
featured a participation threshold that was set at the stable coalition size, but that did not require 
enforcement. The lower public good provision occurred because coalitions that require 
enforcement formed much less frequently, and when they did form there was a significant 
amount of noncompliance within the coalition, even though the expected penalty was chosen to 
be greater than the gain from noncompliance.  
  Relative to stable coalitions that do not require enforcement, two things change when 
coalition members finance enforcement to counteract the incentive each of them has to violate 
their commitments. The first is the compliance decision itself and the second is the theoretical 
outcome that the higher participation cost leads to a higher participation threshold if coalitions 
with member-financed enforcement are to form. Our experimental design allows us to determine 
that both the compliance decision effect and the higher participation cost and threshold effect 
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 contributed to the poor performance of a theoretically stable coalition with member-financed 
enforcement.  
  That both of these components have significant negative impacts are puzzles that require 
further work to fully understand. Like us, other authors have found that increasing the 
participation threshold for a contract to provide a public good reduces the frequency of coalition 
formation and reduces the provision of a public good, but why this occurs is an open question.  
One possible explanation for this in our experiments is that increasing the participation threshold 
increases the free-riding payoffs of those who stay out of coalitions. The increased motivation to 
stay out of stable coalitions and perhaps a motivation to keep individuals from reaping the free-
riding benefit may help explain why coalitions form less frequently with higher participation 
thresholds. This explanation is consistent with our finding that requiring full participation for 
coalitions to form significantly increased the provision of the public good, because requiring full 
participation eliminates the possibility of free riding by refusing to join a coalition.  
  The other puzzle is why there was so much noncompliance in coalitions that required 
enforcement, even though the expected penalty was chosen to be greater than the gain from 
noncompliance regardless of the size of the coalition. It is reasonable to expect, however, that 
more compliance can be induced with more stringent enforcement. Determining whether this 
should be done with more stringent monitoring or a higher penalty requires a more complete 
experimental analysis of the effects of monitoring and penalties on coalition formation and their 
performance. We should note that even if more stringent enforcement can improve the 
performance of theoretically stable coalitions with member-financed enforcement, our results 
suggest that it will not overcome the negative impact of the higher participation cost and 
threshold effect.   
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    Despite these puzzles, our results suggest important lessons for the determination of 
threshold rules for coalition formation and for enforcing compliance within coalitions. Although 
theoretically stable coalitions with member-financed enforcement did not perform well, our 
results, in general, highlight the need for adequate enforcement of voluntary commitments. 
Further, the results illustrate the importance of jointly considering enforcement mechanisms and 
participation requirements when considering cooperative coalitions.  Improving coalition 
formation and compliance within coalitions may require higher participation thresholds, perhaps 
even full participation, and more stringent enforcement than suggested by theory.  
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Table 1: Earnings table for costless enforcement-low 
 
# of OTHER players that 
PRODUCE  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
YOUR earnings if you 
produce  X  X  $10 $13 $16 $19 $22 $25 $28 $31 
YOUR earnings if you 




Table 2:  Earnings table for costly enforcement 
 
  # of OTHER people 
that PRODUCE  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Agree to Produce and 
Produce  $0 $0 $2 $5 $8  $11  $14  $17  $20  $23 
Agree to Produce and 
Don’t Produce – 
Audited 
$0 $0 $0 $3 $6 $9  $12  $15  $18  $21 
Agree to Produce and 
Don’t Produce – 
 Not Audited 







Don’t Agree to 




Table 3: Earnings table for costless enforcement-high 
 
# of OTHER players that 
PRODUCE  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
YOUR earnings if you 
produce  X X X X X  $11  $14  $17  $20  $23 
YOUR earnings if you 




Table 4:  Experimental design summary 
 
Treatment Stable  Coalition 
Size (Participation 
Threshold) 
Number of Subjects 
(group size n = 10) 
Number of Group 
Observations 
(13 periods) 
Number of  
Individual 
Observations 
Costless Enforcement-Low  3 40 52  520 
Costly Enforcement  6 40 52  520 
Costless Enforcement-High  6 40 52  520 
Costly Enforcement-Full  10 40  52  520 




Table 5:  Coalition formation, compliance, and public good provision 
Treatment Average  provision 
of the public good 
Percent of trials in 
which an coalition 
formed 
Average number of 



















































































Standard errors in parentheses, number of observations in brackets. 
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 Table 6:  Average expected earnings when coalitions formed 
 
Treatment / Player Decision 
 
Frequency Average  Period 
Earnings  
    
Costless Enforcement-Low    
     Agree to produce (Coalition members)  213  14.73 (3.73) 
     Do not agree to produce (Non-members)  287  20.07 (3.12) 
    
Costly Enforcement     
     Agree to produce – produce (Compliant coalition members)  128  7.67 (3.92) 
     Agree to produce – not produce (Noncompliant coalition members)  59  7.86 (3.20) 
     Do not  agree to produce (Non-members)  93  21.06 (3.15) 
    
Costless Enforcement-High    
     Agree to produce (Coalition members)  198  11.70 (1.75) 
     Do not agree to produce  (Non-members)  122  26.24 (1.23) 
    
Costly Enforcement-Full    
     Agree to produce – produce (Compliant coalition members)  328  15.46 (4.52) 
     Agree to produce – not produce (Noncompliant coalition members)  132  13.93 (4.42) 
    
Earnings reported in experimental dollars, standard deviations in parentheses. In all treatments, all subjects 




























 Reviewers’ Appendix 
 
A. Experiment instructions – costless enforcement-low 
 
Experiment Instructions  
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment.  The instructions are fairly simple, and 
if you follow them carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to 
you in CASH at the end of the experiment.  The exact amount of money you will earn will 
depend on your decisions, and the decisions made by the other participants, during this 
experiment.   
 
GENERAL DETAILS  
 
Please follow along while I read these instructions out loud.  At times I will ask you to look up at 
the Power Point display at the front of the classroom.  After I have completed reading through 
these instructions, a multiple period experiment will begin.  The experiment will be run on the 
computer monitor at your station and you will use the mouse to make all of your decisions.  
Please do not talk to each other or move around during this experiment!  Please make sure 
all cell phones and other personal electronic equipment are switched off.   
 
Throughout this session, your earnings will be reported in experimental dollars.  10 Experimental 
Dollars equals 1 US dollar.  Your earnings, in US dollars, will be paid to you at the end of the 
experiment in cash.  
   
YOUR DECISIONS 
 
During each period of this experiment you have the opportunity to earn money by deciding 
whether or not to produce one unit of an unspecified product.  There will be 13 periods.   
 
You will be in a group with 9 OTHER members each of whom will be presented with the same 
choices.  The group assignments will change after every period.  You will not be matched up 
with the same other 9 people for more than a single period.   
 
The exact amount of money you will earn will depend on YOUR decisions as well as the 
decisions of the OTHER members in your group.  Likewise, YOUR decisions will affect the 




Before any production decisions are actually made, in each period you must decide whether or 
not you are willing to join an agreement with the other members in your group.  You and the 
other 9 members of your group will choose either to agree to produce or not agree to produce 








WHAT AGREE TO PRODUCE AND NOT AGREE TO PRODUCE MEAN 
 
Choosing agree to produce means you are willing to join an agreement with the other members 
in your group.  The agreement will only form if at least 3 group members in total choose agree to 
produce, otherwise the agreement will not form.  
 
•  If the agreement forms:   
 
Those that agreed to produce automatically produce the product.  Those that did not 
agree to produce automatically do not produce the product.  
 
•  If the agreement does not form: 
  
  Each person in the group does not produce the product, the period ends and each 
  person earns 8 Experimental Dollars.         
 
•  Choosing to not agree to produce means you will not produce the product, regardless if 
the agreement forms. 
 
 
To recap, once each person in your group has made his/her decision to agree or not agree to 
produce, one of two things can happen:   
 
(1) If 3 or more members of the group chose agree to produce then those that agreed to 
produce automatically produce the product.  Those that did not agree to produce 
automatically do not produce the product.  
 
(2) If less than 3 members in the group chose agree to produce then the period ends and 
ALL members of the group automatically do not produce the product and each person 
earns 8 Experimental Dollars. 
       
 
 
















Recall, if the agreement does not form, ALL people in the group do not produce the product and 
each member earns 8 Experimental Dollars.  At that point the period ends.   
 
The Earnings Table, provided below, shows your earnings for each possible outcome when the 




The bottom two rows of the table list your two choices and potential earnings.  Notice that your 
information is all in black.  The top row indicates the number of other people in your group 
producing the product (ranging from 0 to 9 people).  Notice that the information pertaining to the 
other members in your group is all in blue.  
 
The boxes marked with Xs indicate impossible outcomes.  Recall, in order for any production to 
occur, at least 3 people in your group must agree to produce.  Therefore, the two scenarios that 
can exist are: 
 
•  If less than 3 people agree to produce, zero people will produce and each person in the 
group earns 8 Experimental Dollars. 
 
•   If 3 or more people agree to produce, all those that agree actually produce the product.   
 
 
To get a feel for how the table works, let’s go through two examples: 
 
Example 1: Suppose that all the other people in your group have made their decisions.  
Specifically, 4 other people chose agree to produce.  First note that because 3 or more people in 
total agreed to produce, the agreement has formed.  Given this: 
 
•  If you chose agree to produce you would earn 16 experimental dollars ($1.60 US).   
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•  If you chose to not agree to produce, you would earn 20 experimental dollars ($2.00 
US).   
 
 
Example 2: Suppose that all the other people in your group have made their decisions.  
Specifically, 2 other people chose agree to produce.  Given this: 
 
•  If you chose agree to produce, the agreement would form and you would earn 10 
Experimental Dollars.   
 
•  If you chose to not agree to produce, the agreement would not form and you would earn 
8 Experimental Dollars.   
 
 
HOW THE EXPERIMENT WORKS 
 
Once we have finished reading the instructions you will begin the experiment.  To do so, you 
must click the green “READY TO START” button in the top right corner of your screen.  
 
Once each member of your group has clicked the button, the first period will begin. 
     
The image below is an example of the first screen that will appear during each period of play.    
Notice that the I agree to produce and I do not agree to produce buttons are in the center-left 
area of the screen.  Once any person in the group makes a decision, the buttons become inactive 
for 1 second in order to notify the entire group that a decision has been made.   
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Notice also that you only have a limited amount of time to make your decision.  The clock in the 
top area of the screen will indicate the time remaining.  Also in the upper left area are boxes 
indicating the number of other members of the group who have agreed to produce, the number 
who did not agree to produce and the number of people who have not yet chosen.  When you or 
another member in your group makes a decision, the corresponding box in the upper left area 
will quickly flash yellow.    
 
In the example screen shot above, 2 other people have agreed to produce, 1 other person has not 
agreed to produce and 6 other people have not yet chosen. [Please now look up at the PowerPoint 
Display]  
 
If at anytime the agreement forms (3 or more people agreed to produce), the screen will display 
that the agreement has formed.     
 
Once each member of the group has made their decision OR the time on the clock has run out, 
Stage 1 will be over.  Those who did not make a decision by the time the clock runs out will be 
automatically counted as NOT agreeing to produce.  At that point, a message box will pop-up 
indicating whether or not the agreement has formed. 
 
 
END OF PERIOD 
 
After all groups have finished making their decisions, the period will be over.  At that point a 
Period Results box will appear at the bottom of your monitor displaying the period outcomes, 
your earnings for the period and your cumulative earnings thus far.  An example of the Period 






In the example Period Results Table above, a total of 5 people agreed to produce.  Because 3 or 
more players agreed to produce, the agreement did form.  A summary of the period and total 
earnings is also provided in the right-hand side of the box. [Please now look up at the 
PowerPoint Display] 
Once you have had a chance to look at the Period Results you can click the green “Ready to 
Start” button at the top of the screen to begin the next period.  Once all groups are ready, the 
next period will begin immediately.  
 
END OF EXPERIMENT 
 
The experiment will have 13 periods.  You will be notified on your computer monitor once the 
experiment has ended and a summary screen with your total earnings will be displayed.  At that 





•  During each period of play you choose either to agree to produce OR not agree to 
produce.   
 
•  If the agreement forms, those who agreed to produce automatically produce the product 
and those who did not agree to produce automatically do not produce the product.  If the 
agreement does not form, ALL members of the group do not produce and the period 
ends.  Each person earns 8 Experimental Dollars. 
 
•  If the agreement forms, the exact amount of money you earn each period is determined 
both by your choice and the choices made by the other members in your group.  The 
Earnings Table if the Agreement Forms on your screen displays all of your earning 
possibilities.   
 
•  10 Experimental Dollars = 1 U.S. Dollar.  Fractions of a dollar will be rounded up to the 
nearest quarter. 
 
•  This experiment has 13 periods.  You will not be matched up with the same 9 people for 
more than 1 period. 
 
•  Once the experiment has finished, please remain seated until you have received your 
earnings.  THANKS! 
 
 
Once the green “Ready to Start” button becomes active, you can click this button to begin 





 B. Experiment instructions – costless enforcement-high 
 
Experiment Instructions  
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment.  The instructions are fairly simple, and 
if you follow them carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to 
you in CASH at the end of the experiment.  The exact amount of money you will earn will 
depend on your decisions, and the decisions made by the other participants, during this 
experiment.   
 
GENERAL DETAILS  
 
Please follow along while I read these instructions out loud.  At times I will ask you to look up at 
the Power Point display at the front of the classroom.  After I have completed reading through 
these instructions, a multiple period experiment will begin.  The experiment will be run on the 
computer monitor at your station and you will use the mouse to make all of your decisions.  
Please do not talk to each other or move around during this experiment!  Please make sure 
all cell phones and other personal electronic equipment are switched off.   
 
Throughout this session, your earnings will be reported in experimental dollars.  10 Experimental 
Dollars equals 1 US dollar.  Your earnings, in US dollars, will be paid to you at the end of the 
experiment in cash.  
   
YOUR DECISIONS 
 
During each period of this experiment you have the opportunity to earn money by deciding 
whether or not to produce one unit of an unspecified product.  There will be 13 periods.   
 
You will be in a group with 9 OTHER members each of whom will be presented with the same 
choices.  The group assignments will change after every period.  You will not be matched up 
with the same other 9 people for more than a single period.   
 
The exact amount of money you will earn will depend on YOUR decisions as well as the 
decisions of the OTHER members in your group.  Likewise, YOUR decisions will affect the 




Before any production decisions are actually made, in each period you must decide whether or 
not you are willing to join an agreement with the other members in your group.  You and the 
other 9 members of your group will choose either to agree to produce or not agree to produce 








WHAT AGREE TO PRODUCE AND NOT AGREE TO PRODUCE MEAN 
 
Choosing agree to produce means you are willing to join an agreement with the other members 
in your group.  The agreement will only form if at least 6 group members in total choose agree to 
produce, otherwise the agreement will not form.  
 
•  If the agreement forms:   
 
Those that agreed to produce automatically produce the product.  Those that did not 
agree to produce automatically do not produce the product.  
 
•  If the agreement does not form: 
  
  Each person in the group does not produce the product, the period ends and each 
  person earns 8 Experimental Dollars.         
 
•  Choosing to not agree to produce means you will not produce the product, regardless if 
the agreement forms. 
 
 
To recap, once each person in your group has made his/her decision to agree or not agree to 
produce, one of two things can happen:   
 
(1) If 6 or more members of the group chose agree to produce then those that agreed to 
produce automatically produce the product.  Those that did not agree to produce 
automatically do not produce the product.  
 
(2) If less than 6 members in the group chose agree to produce then the period ends and 
ALL members of the group automatically do not produce the product and each person 
earns 8 Experimental Dollars. 
       
 
 
















Recall, if the agreement does not form, ALL people in the group do not produce the product and 
each member earns 8 Experimental Dollars.  At that point the period ends.   
 
The Earnings Table, provided below, shows your earnings for each possible outcome when the 




The bottom two rows of the table list your two choices and potential earnings.  Notice that your 
information is all in black.  The top row indicates the number of other people in your group 
producing the product (ranging from 0 to 9 people).  Notice that the information pertaining to the 
other members in your group is all in blue.  
 
The boxes marked with Xs indicate impossible outcomes.  Recall, in order for any production to 
occur, at least 6 people in your group must agree to produce.  Therefore, the two scenarios that 
can exist are: 
 
•  If less than 6 people agree to produce, zero people will produce and each person in the 
group earns 8 Experimental Dollars. 
 
•   If 6 or more people agree to produce, all those that agree ‘actually’ produce the product.   
 
 
To get a feel for how the table works, let’s go through two examples: 
 
Example 1: Suppose that all the other people in your group have made their decisions.  
Specifically, 7 other people chose agree to produce.  First note that because 6 or more people in 
total agreed to produce, the agreement has formed.  Given this: 
 
•  If you chose agree to produce you would earn 17 experimental dollars ($1.70 US).   
 
•  If you chose to not agree to produce, you would earn 29 experimental dollars ($2.90 




Example 2: Suppose that all the other people in your group have made their decisions.  
Specifically, 5 other people chose agree to produce.  Given this: 
 
•  If you chose agree to produce, the agreement would form and you would earn 11 
Experimental Dollars.   
 
•  If you chose to not agree to produce, the agreement would not form and you would earn 
8 Experimental Dollars.   
 
 
HOW THE EXPERIMENT WORKS 
 
Once we have finished reading the instructions you will begin the experiment.  To do so, you 
must click the green “READY TO START” button in the top right corner of your screen.  
 
Once each member of your group has clicked the button, the first period will begin. 
     
The image below is an example of the first screen that will appear during each period of play.    
Notice that the I agree to produce and I do not agree to produce buttons are in the center-left 
area of the screen.  Once any person in the group makes a decision, the buttons become inactive 
for 1 second in order to notify the entire group that a decision has been made.   
 
   
 
Notice also that you only have a limited amount of time to make your decision.  The clock in the 
top area of the screen will indicate the time remaining.  Also in the upper left area are boxes 
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 indicating the number of other members of the group who have agreed to produce, the number 
who did not agree to produce and the number of people who have not yet chosen.  When you or 
another member in your group makes a decision, the corresponding box in the upper left area 
will quickly flash yellow.    
 
In the example screen shot above, 2 other people have agreed to produce, 1 other person has not 
agreed to produce and 6 other people have not yet chosen. [Please now look up at the PowerPoint 
Display]  
 
If at anytime the agreement forms (6 or more people agreed to produce), the screen will display 
that the agreement has formed.     
 
Once each member of the group has made their decision OR the time on the clock has run out, 
the period will be over.  Those who did not make a decision by the time the clock runs out will 
be automatically counted as NOT agreeing to produce.  At that point, a message box will pop-up 
indicating whether or not the agreement has formed. 
 
 
END OF PERIOD 
 
After all groups have finished making their decisions, the period will be over.  At that point a 
Period Results box will appear at the bottom of your monitor displaying the period outcomes, 
your earnings for the period and your cumulative earnings thus far.  An example of the Period 






In the example Period Results Table above, a total of 8 people agreed to produce.  Because 6 or 
more players agreed to produce, the agreement did form.  A summary of the period and total 
earnings is also provided in the right-hand side of the box. [Please now look up at the 
PowerPoint Display] 
 
Once you have had a chance to look at the Period Results you can click the green “Ready to 
Start” button at the top of the screen to begin the next period.  Once all groups are ready, the 
next period will begin immediately.  
END OF EXPERIMENT 
 
The experiment will have 13 periods.  You will be notified on your computer monitor once the 
experiment has ended and a summary screen with your total earnings will be displayed.  At that 





•  During each period of play you choose either to agree to produce OR not agree to 
produce.   
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 •  If the agreement forms, those who agreed to produce automatically produce the product 
and those who did not agree to produce automatically do not produce the product.  If the 
agreement does not form, ALL members of the group do not produce and the period 
ends.  Each person earns 8 Experimental Dollars. 
 
•  If the agreement forms, the exact amount of money you earn each period is determined 
both by your choice and the choices made by the other members in your group.  The 
Earnings Table if the Agreement Forms on your screen displays all of your earning 
possibilities.   
 
•  10 Experimental Dollars = 1 U.S. Dollar.  Fractions of a dollar will be rounded up to the 
nearest quarter. 
 
•  This experiment has 13 periods.  You will not be matched up with the same 9 people for 
more than 1 period. 
 
•  Once the experiment has finished, please remain seated until you have received your 
earnings.  THANKS! 
 
 
Once the green “Ready to Start” button becomes active, you can click this button to begin 


























 C. Experiment instructions – costly enforcement 
 
Experiment Instructions  
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment.  The instructions are fairly simple, and 
if you follow them carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to 
you in CASH at the end of the experiment.  The exact amount of money you will earn will 
depend on your decisions, and the decisions made by the other participants, during this 
experiment.   
 
GENERAL DETAILS  
 
Please follow along while I read these instructions out loud.  At times I will ask you to look up at 
the Power Point display at the front of the classroom.  After I have completed reading through 
these instructions, a multiple period experiment will begin.  The experiment will be run on the 
computer monitor at your station and you will use the mouse to make all of your decisions.  
Please do not talk to each other or move around during this experiment!  Please make sure 
all cell phones and other personal electronic equipment are switched off.   
 
Throughout this session, your earnings will be reported in experimental dollars.  10 Experimental 
Dollars equals 1 US dollar.  Your earnings, in US dollars, will be paid to you at the end of the 
experiment in cash.  
   
YOUR DECISIONS 
 
During each period of this experiment you have the opportunity to earn money by deciding 
whether or not to produce one unit of an unspecified product.  There will be 13 periods.   
 
You will be in a group with 9 OTHER members each of whom will be presented with the same 
choices.  The group assignments will change after every period.  You will not be matched up 
with the same other 9 people for more than a single period.   
 
The exact amount of money you will earn will depend on YOUR decisions as well as the 
decisions of the OTHER members in your group.  Likewise, YOUR decisions will affect the 





Before any production decisions are actually made, in Stage 1 of each period you first must 
decide whether or not you are willing to join an agreement with the other members in your 
group.  You and the other 9 members of your group will choose either to agree to produce or not 







WHAT AGREE TO PRODUCE AND NOT AGREE TO PRODUCE MEAN 
 
Choosing agree to produce means you are willing to join an agreement with the other members 
in your group.  The agreement will only form if at least 6 group members in total choose agree to 
produce, otherwise the agreement will not form.  
 
•  If the agreement forms:   
 
Those that joined the agreement then move onto Stage 2.  Those that move onto Stage 2 
will have the opportunity to ‘comply’ with what they agreed to.  That is, in Stage 2 they 
are given the opportunity to either produce or not produce.   
 
•  If the agreement does not form: 
  
  Each person in the group does not produce the product, the period ends and each 
  person earns 8 Experimental Dollars.         
 
•  Choosing to not agree to produce means you will not produce the product, regardless if 
the agreement forms. 
 
 
To recap, once each person in your group has made his/her decision to agree or not agree to 
produce, one of two things can happen:   
 
(1) If 6 or more members of the group chose agree to produce then only those who agreed to 
produce move onto Stage 2.  Those who move onto Stage 2 are given the opportunity to produce 
or not produce.  Those that did not agree to produce automatically do not produce the product 
and must wait for others to make their decisions in Stage 2.   
 
(2) If less than 6 members in the group chose agree to produce then the period ends and ALL 
members of the group automatically do not produce the product and each person earns 8 
Experimental Dollars.      
       
 
 














To reiterate, if the agreement forms, those who agreed to produce will have the opportunity to 
comply with the decision they made in Stage 1.  That is, they can choose either to produce or not 
produce in Stage 2.   
 
The decisions made in Stage 2 will be audited with a probability of .8.  Meaning, there is an 80% 
chance each person in the group is audited and a 20% chance each person in the group is not 
audited.  Those people who are audited and who chose not produce will be fined 6 
Experimental Dollars.  People who are audited and chose produce, or are not audited, will not 







































Recall, if the agreement does not form, ALL people in the group do not produce the product and 
each member earns 8 Experimental Dollars.  At that point the period ends.   
 
The Earnings Table if the Agreement Forms, provided below, shows your earnings for each 
possible outcome when the agreement forms.  This is the exact table you will be given on your 




(3)  (1) 
 
The bottom four rows of the table list your four possible choices and potential earnings.  Notice 
that your information is all in black.  The top row of the table lists the number of other members 
in your group choosing to produce (0 to 9 people).  Notice that the information pertaining to the 
other members in your group is in blue. [Please now look up at the PowerPoint Display]   
(2) 
 
To get a feel for how the table works, let’s go through a few examples: 
 
Example 1: Suppose all 10 members of the group agreed to produce in Stage 1.  Therefore, the 
agreement forms because at least 6 people have agreed to produce and every member of the 
group moves onto Stage 2.   In Stage 2, suppose that 8 other people in your group chose to 
produce and 1 other person chose to not produce.  Given this, your period earnings would be 
one of the following: 
 
(1) If you chose to produce in Stage 2, you would earn 20 Experimental Dollars.  
 
(2) If you chose not produce in Stage 2 and WERE NOT audited, you would earn 24 
Experimental Dollars.   
 
(3) If you chose not produce in Stage 2 and WERE audited, you would be charged a penalty of 6 
and therefore you would earn 18 Experimental Dollars. 
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  Note that each of these scenarios is numbered on the table above. 
Example 2: Suppose only 4 other members in your group agreed to produce by the end of Stage 
1.  In this case, the agreement does not form and ALL members of the group do not produce the 
product, the period ends and each member earns 8 Experimental Dollars.   
 
Practice Questions:  Please follow along as I read the following practice questions.  For each 
question, fill in the blank with the correct answer.  After you have had a chance to answer the 
questions, I will then go over the answers. 
 
Question 1:  Suppose you have not yet made your decision whether or not to agree to produce in 
Stage 1.  Also assume that the other 9 members of your group have all made their decisions.  
Specifically, 5 other people have agreed to produce and 4 other people have not agreed to 
produce.   
 
•  Given the choices made by your group members, if you chose to agree to produce would 
the agreement form (Y/N)? ___. 
 
•  Given the choices made by your group members, if you chose to NOT agree to produce 
would the agreement form (Y/N)? ___.  How many Experimental Dollars would you earn 
in this case? ____. 
 
  Please now look up at the PowerPoint Display 
 
Question 2:  Suppose you and 8 other members of your group agreed to produce in Stage 1.   
Once in Stage 2, what would your experimental earnings be if: 
 
•  7 other group members chose to produce, 1 chose not to produce and you chose to 
produce? ___. 
 
•  7 other group members chose to produce, 1 chose not to produce and you chose not to 
produce and were NOT audited? ___. 
 
•  7 other group members chose to produce, 1 chose not to produce and you chose not to 
produce and were audited? ____. 
 




HOW THE EXPERIMENT WORKS 
 
Once we have finished reading the instructions you will begin the experiment.  To do so, you 
must click the green “READY TO START” button in the top right corner of your screen.  
 
Once each member of your group has clicked the button, the first period will begin. 
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The image below is an example of the first screen that will appear during each period of play.    
Notice that the I agree to produce and I do not agree to produce buttons are in the center-left 
area of the screen.  Once any person in the group makes a decision, the buttons become inactive 
for 1 second in order to notify the entire group that a decision has been made.   
 
   
 
Notice also that you only have a limited amount of time to make your decision.  The clock in the 
top area of the screen will indicate the time remaining.  Also in the upper left area are boxes 
indicating the number of other members of the group who have agreed to produce, the number 
who did not agree to produce and the number of people who have not yet chosen.  When you or 
another member in your group makes a decision, the corresponding box in the upper left area 
will quickly flash yellow.    
 
In the example screen shot above, 2 other people have agreed to produce, 1 other person has not 
agreed to produce and 6 other people have not yet chosen. [Please now look up at the PowerPoint 
Display]  
 
If at anytime the agreement forms (6 or more people agreed to produce), the screen will display 
that the agreement has formed.     
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 Once each member of the group has made their decision OR the time on the clock has run out, 
Stage 1 will be over.  Those who did not make a decision by the time the clock runs out will be 
automatically counted as NOT agreeing to produce.  At that point, a message box will pop-up 




Recall, if the agreement forms (6 or more people agreed to produce), those who agreed to 
produce will have the opportunity to produce or not produce in Stage 2.  The screen shot below 
is an example of Stage 2 in which you and 8 other group members agreed to produce.  Notice 





END OF PERIOD 
 
After all groups have finished making their decisions in Stage 2, the period will be over.  At that 
point a Period Results box will appear at the bottom of your monitor displaying the outcomes 
and your earnings for the period, your cumulative earnings thus far, information regarding the 
decisions made by you and all the members in your group and whether you were audited.  An 






In the example Period Results Table above, a total of 9 people agreed to produce in Stage 1.  
However in Stage 2, only 8 of those 9 people actually produced.  The person in the example 
above chose to produce in Stage 2.  The person was audited but not penalized because he/she 
chose to produce.  A summary of the period and total earnings is also provided in the right-hand 
side of the box. [Please now look up at the PowerPoint Display] 
 
Once you have had a chance to look at the Period Results you can click the green “Ready to 
Start” button at the top of the screen to begin the next period.  Once all groups are ready, the 
next period will begin immediately.  
 
 
END OF EXPERIMENT 
 
The experiment will have 13 periods.  You will be notified on your computer monitor once the 
experiment has ended and a summary screen with your total earnings will be displayed.  At that 










•  In Stage 1 during each period of play you choose either to agree to produce OR not 
agree to produce.   
 
•  If the agreement forms, those who agreed to produce in Stage 1 have the opportunity to 
produce or not produce in Stage 2.  If the agreement does not form, ALL members of the 
group do not produce and the period ends.  Each person earns 8 Experimental Dollars. 
 
•  The decisions made in Stage 2 will be audited with a probability of .8.  Those people who 
are audited and who chose not produce will be fined 6 Experimental Dollars.       
 
•  If the agreement forms, the exact amount of money you earn each period is determined 
both by your choice and the choices made by the other members in your group.  The 
Earnings Table if the Agreement Forms on your screen displays all of your earning 
possibilities.   
 
•  10 Experimental Dollars = 1 U.S. Dollar.  Fractions of a dollar will be rounded up to the 
nearest quarter. 
 
•  This experiment has 13 periods.  You will not be matched up with the same 9 people for 
more than 1 period. 
 
•  Once the experiment has finished, please remain seated until you have received your 
earnings.  THANKS! 
 
 
Once the green “Ready to Start” button becomes active, you can click this button to begin 



















 D. Experiment instructions – costly enforcement-full 
 
Experiment Instructions  
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment.  The instructions are fairly simple, and 
if you follow them carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to 
you in CASH at the end of the experiment.  The exact amount of money you will earn will 
depend on your decisions, and the decisions made by the other participants, during this 
experiment.   
 
GENERAL DETAILS  
 
Please follow along while I read these instructions out loud.  At times I will ask you to look up at 
the PowerPoint slides displayed on the monitors around the room.  After I have completed 
reading through these instructions, a multiple period experiment will begin.  The experiment will 
be run on the computer monitor at your station and you will use the mouse to make all of your 
decisions.  Please do not talk to each other or move around during this experiment!  Please 
make sure all cell phones and other personal electronic equipment are switched off.   
 
Throughout this session, your earnings will be reported in experimental dollars.  10 Experimental 
Dollars equals 1 US dollar.  Your earnings, in US dollars, will be paid to you at the end of the 
experiment in cash.  
   
YOUR DECISIONS 
 
During each period of this experiment you have the opportunity to earn money by deciding 
whether or not to produce one unit of an unspecified product.  There will be 13 periods.   
 
You will be in a group with 9 OTHER members each of whom will be presented with the same 
choices.  The group assignments will change after every period.  You will not be matched up 
with the same other 9 people for more than a single period.   
 
The exact amount of money you will earn will depend on YOUR decisions as well as the 
decisions of the OTHER members in your group.  Likewise, YOUR decisions will affect the 





Before any production decisions are actually made, in Stage 1 of each period you first must 
decide whether or not you are willing to join an agreement with the other members in your 
group.  You and the other 9 members of your group will choose either to agree to produce or not 







WHAT AGREE TO PRODUCE AND NOT AGREE TO PRODUCE MEAN 
 
Choosing agree to produce means you are willing to join an agreement with the other members 
in your group.  The agreement will only form if all 10 group members choose agree to produce, 
otherwise the agreement will not form.  
 
•  If the agreement forms:   
 
You and the other 9 group members all move onto stage Stage 2 where each of you will 
have the opportunity to ‘comply’ with what you agreed to.  That is, in Stage 2 you are 
given the opportunity to either produce or not produce.   
 
•  If the agreement does not form: 
  
  Each person in the group does not produce the product, the period ends and each 
  person earns 8 Experimental Dollars.         
 
 
To recap, once each person in your group has made his/her decision to agree or not agree to 
produce, one of two things can happen:   
 
(1) If all 10 members of the group chose agree to produce in Stage 1, then everyone moves to 
Stage 2.  In Stage 2, you and the other 9 group members are given the opportunity to produce or 
not produce.   
 
(2) If less than 10 members in the group chose agree to produce in Stage 1, then the period ends 
and ALL members of the group automatically do not produce the product and each person earns 
8 experimental dollars.      
       
 
 


















To reiterate, if all 10 group members agree to produce in Stage 1, everyone then gets to decide 
either to produce or not produce in Stage 2.   
 
The decisions made in Stage 2 will be audited with a probability of .8.  Meaning, there is an 80% 
chance each person in the group is audited and a 20% chance each person in the group is not 
audited.  Those people who are audited and who chose not produce will be fined 6 experimental 









































Recall, if the agreement does not form, everyone in the group does not produce the product and 
each member earns 8 experimental dollars.  At that point the period ends.   
 
The Earnings Table if the Agreement Forms, provided below, shows your earnings for each 
possible outcome when the agreement forms.  This is the exact table you will be given on your 




(3)  (1) 
 
The bottom four rows of the table list your four possible choices and potential earnings.  Notice 
that your information is all in black.  The top row of the table lists the number of other members 
in your group choosing to produce (0 to 9 people).  Notice that the information pertaining to the 
other members in your group is in blue.  [Please look up at the PowerPoint Display] 
(2) 
 
To get a feel for how the table works, let’s go through a few examples: 
 
Example: In Stage 2, suppose that 8 other people in your group chose to produce and 1 other 
person chose to not produce.  Given this, your period earnings would be one of the following: 
 
(1) If you chose to produce in Stage 2, you would earn 20 Experimental Dollars.  
 
(2) If you chose not produce in Stage 2 and WERE NOT audited, you would earn 24 
Experimental Dollars.   
 
(3) If you chose not produce in Stage 2 and WERE audited, you would be charged a penalty of 6 
and therefore you would earn 18 Experimental Dollars. 
 




Practice Questions:  Please follow along as I read the following practice questions.  For each 
question, fill in the blank with the correct answer.  After you have had a chance to answer the 
questions, I will then go over the answers. 
 
Question 1:  Suppose you have not yet made your decision whether or not to agree to produce in 
Stage 1.  Also assume that the other 9 members of your group have all made their decisions.  
Specifically, the 9 other people have all agreed to produce. 
 
•  Given the choices made by your group members, if you chose to agree to produce would 
the agreement form (Y/N)? ___. 
 
•  Given the choices made by your group members, if you chose to NOT agree to produce 
would the agreement form (Y/N)? ___.  How many Experimental Dollars would you earn 
in this case? ____. 
 
[Please now look up at the PowerPoint Display] 
 
  
Question 2:  Suppose you and the other 9 members of your group agreed to produce in Stage 1.   
Once in Stage 2, what would your experimental earnings be if: 
 
•  7 other group members chose to produce, 2 chose not to produce and you chose to 
produce? ___. 
 
•  7 other group members chose to produce, 2 chose not to produce and you chose not to 
produce and were NOT audited? ___. 
 
•  7 other group members chose to produce, 2 chose not to produce and you chose not to 
produce and were audited? ____. 
 

















HOW THE EXPERIMENT WORKS 
 
Once we have finished reading the instructions you will begin the experiment.  To do so, you 
must click the green “READY TO START” button in the top right corner of your screen.  
 
Once each member of your group has clicked the button, the first period will begin. 




The image below is an example of the first screen that will appear during each period of play.    
Notice that the I agree to produce and I do not agree to produce buttons are in the center-left 
area of the screen.  Once any person in the group makes a decision, the buttons become inactive 
for 1 second in order to notify the entire group that a decision has been made.   
 
   
 
Notice also that you only have a limited amount of time to make your decision.  The clock in the 
top area of the screen will indicate the time remaining.  Also in the upper left area are boxes 
indicating the number of other members of the group who have agreed to produce, the number 
who did not agree to produce and the number of people who have not yet chosen.  When you or 
another member in your group makes a decision, the corresponding box in the upper left area 





In the example screen shot above, 3 other people have agreed to produce, 0 other people have not 
agreed to produce and 6 other people have not yet chosen. [Please now look up at the PowerPoint 
Display]  
 
Once each member of the group has made their decision OR the time on the clock has run out, 
Stage 1 will be over.  Those who did not make a decision by the time the clock runs out will be 
automatically counted as NOT agreeing to produce.  At that point, a message box will pop-up 




Recall, if you and the other 9 group members all agree to produce, you will have the opportunity 
to produce or not produce in Stage 2.  The screen shot below is an example of Stage 2.  Notice 






END OF PERIOD 
 
After all groups have finished making their decisions in Stage 2, the period will be over.  At that 
point a Period Results box will appear at the bottom of your monitor displaying the outcomes 
and your earnings for the period, your cumulative earnings thus far, information regarding the 
decisions made by you and all the members in your group and whether you were audited.  An 





In the example Period Results box above, all group members agreed to produce in Stage 1.  
However in Stage 2, only 8 of the 10 people actually produced.  The person in the example 
above chose not to produce in Stage 2.  The person was audited and therefore penalized 6 
experimental dollars because he/she chose not to produce.  A summary of the period and total 
earnings is also provided in the right-hand side of the box.  [Please now look up at the 
PowerPoint Display]  
 
Once you have had a chance to look at the Period Results you can click the green “Ready to 
Start” button at the top of the screen to begin the next period.  Once all groups are ready, the 
next period will begin immediately.  
 
 
END OF EXPERIMENT 
 
The experiment will have 13 periods.  You will be notified on your computer monitor once the 
experiment has ended and a summary screen with your total earnings will be displayed.  At that 


























•  In Stage 1 during each period of play you choose either to agree to produce OR not 
agree to produce.   
 
•  If the agreement forms (everyone agrees to produce) in Stage 1, everyone will have the 
opportunity to produce or not produce in Stage 2.  If the agreement does not form, ALL 
members of the group do not produce and the period ends.  Each person earns 8 
Experimental Dollars. 
 
•  The decisions made in Stage 2 will be audited with a probability of .8.  Those people who 
are audited and who chose not produce will be fined 6 Experimental Dollars.       
 
•  If the agreement forms, the exact amount of money you earn each period is determined 
both by your choice and the choices made by the other members in your group.  The 
Earnings Table if the Agreement Forms on your screen displays all of your earning 
possibilities.   
 
•  10 Experimental Dollars = 1 U.S. Dollar.  Fractions of a dollar will be rounded up to the 
nearest quarter. 
 
•  This experiment has 13 periods.  You will not be matched up with the same 9 people for 
more than 1 period. 
 
•  Once the experiment has finished, please remain seated until you have received your 
earnings.  THANKS! 
 
 
Once the green “Ready to Start” button becomes active, you can click this button to begin 
the experiment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 